ABSTRACT Understanding the actions of other people is a key component of social interaction. This paper used an electroencephalography and functional near infrared spectroscopy (EEG-fNIRS) bimodal system to investigate the temporal-spatial features of action intention understanding. We measured brain activation while participants observed three actions: 1) grasping a cup for drinking; 2) grasping a cup for moving; and 3) no meaningful intention. Analysis of EEG maximum standardized current density revealed that brain activation transitioned from the left to the right hemisphere. EEG-fNIRS source analysis results revealed that both the mirror neuron system and theory of mind network are involved in action intention understanding, and the extent to which these two systems are engaged appears to be determined by the clarity of the observed intention. These findings indicate that action intention understanding is a complex and dynamic process.
I. INTRODUCTION
Humans have a highly developed ability to understand the intentions associated with the actions of others. Although this phenomenon may seem simple, it involves complex neural mechanisms. Although the precise neural correlates of action intention understanding have not yet been identified, many brain regions are thought to play key roles in the inference of intention from actions. A number of studies have examined neural systems to explore the basis of action intention understanding, and the mirror neuron system (MNS) and ''theory of mind'' (ToM) network have been proposed to underlie intention recognition [1] - [4] .
Imaging studies of the MNS have suggested that executed and observed goal-directed grasping movements are encoded in a circuit comprising the premotor cortex (PMC), inferior parietal lobule (IPL), and posterior regions of the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), with the possible involvement of cortical regions such as the superior parietal lobule (SPL) [5] - [9] . A recent study suggested that the representation of one's own and others' actions is mediated by the MNS through internal simulation and replication of observed actions [10] - [12] . In addition, it has been hypothesized that the activation of mirror neurons plays a fundamental role in action understanding, referred to as the ''direct matching hypothesis'' [13] . This hypothesis maintains that, given that neurons in the PMC encode the goal of a motor act, when these neurons become active during the observation of a motor act performed by others, the goal of that motor act is represented in the observer's motor system, and consequently understood [13] , [14] . In the MNS, neurons that encode sequences of motor acts are arranged in the form of action goal-specific neuronal chains [15] . These chains are thought to represent the neural substrate for implementing the agent's motor intention [16] .
In addition to the MNS, brain areas involved in mentalization, i.e., ToM, may also be engaged in action intention understanding. The ''theory of mind'' (ToM), is the ability to attribute and reason about the mental states of other individuals. There is widespread agreement about the existence of a widely distributed neural network underpinning ToM, which includes the right and left temporo-parietal junction (RTPJ/LTPJ), superior temporal sulcus (STS), posterior cingulate cortex/precuneus (PCC/PC) and medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) [1] , [17] , [18] . According to ToM theory, humans experience others as goal-directed and intentional agents. Researchers have defined ToM as the ability to explain and predict the behavior of others, based on observation of their intentional actions [19] . ToM ability thus enables people to regard others as having mental states, which allows sophisticated action understanding, such as the understanding that behavior is driven by intentions and that actions are directed towards goals [20] .
The relationship between the MNS and ToM network is complex. Previous studies have proposed three perspectives regarding the relationship between the MNS and ToM network. First, in terms of the processing mechanisms underlying these phenomena, the MNS is thought to be responsible for automatic behavior identification, which is initiated by the presence of social stimuli and can be completed with little conscious intervention; in contrast, ToM network is thought to be responsible for controlled social attribution, activated by the top-down goal of inferring mental states [21] . This perspective is known as the ''dual processing model'', where the MNS is involved in automatic processing, while the ToM network underlies controlled processing [21] . Spunt et al. [21] compared the difference between two distinct levels of cognitive load (high and low) in understanding three types of intention (what, how and why). Their results indicated that the MNS was not engaged, regardless of the type of intention. However, the ToM network was found to be affected by high levels of cognitive load when understanding why actions are performed. In addition, ToM-related brain regions were reported to be activated while inferring mental states [21] . Second, the MNS and ToM network are reported to be functionally complementary, playing different roles in understanding actions [2] , [22] . While the MNS encodes the intention of the action automatically based on visual properties (how and what), the ToM network is specifically responsible for the inference of others' mental state (why) [4] , [22] , [23] . Third, the MNS and ToM network appear to operate in a complementary way, with the MNS is thought to inform and support the ToM network [3] , [22] . When individuals observe actions that are inconsistent, implausible, pretended, or unexpected for the observer, both simulation (via the MNS) and mentalizing (via the ToM network) processes appear to work in conjunction [3] , [22] . Some studies have indicated that information about a simulated action in the MNS is passed to core ToM regions for inferring an agent's intention [4] , [24] , [25] . A meta-analysis of more than 200 functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) activation studies revealed that the MNS (including the IPL and IFG) is related to processing biological motion (moving body parts), while the ToM network (MPFC, PCC, and TPJ) is related to more abstract processing of others' intentions [22] .
To investigate the temporal-spatial features of intention understanding processing, in the current study, we used electroencephalography (EEG) and functional near infrared spectroscopy (fNIRS) for synchronous measurement of brain signals. EEG has high temporal resolution, and measures non-local but whole-head electrical signals. In contrast, fNIRS measures local cerebral blood oxygen signals beneath a set of optodes. fNIRS has poor temporal resolution, but favorable anti-jamming capabilities. Thus, EEG-fNIRS bimodal measurement may provide comprehensive information, both in terms of the quantity and quality of data, by combining the advantages of both measures [26] .
Compared with EEG, which is already widely used in research into intention understanding [27] - [33] , few studies have used fNIRS to investigate intention understanding [34] - [36] . fNIRS is a noninvasive method for measuring cerebral activity and cerebral blood flow with near-infrared light (650−1000 nm) using a headset fitted with optical optodes [37] , [38] . Changes in cerebral oxygenated hemoglobin (HbO) and deoxygenated hemoglobin (HbR) occur during certain cognitive tasks. fNIRS employs multiple pairs of near-infrared light emitter/detectors operating at two or more wavelengths. Infra-red light emitted onto the scalp penetrates brain tissue, where the majority is absorbed by the tissues or diffuses because of photon scattering. However, a proportion of infra-red light exits the scalp after passing through the cortical brain region, where the HbO and HbR chromophores in the light-path absorb light with different absorption coefficients. The exiting photons are detected by strategically positioned detectors, and the intensity of the detected light is used to calculate HbO and HbR concentration changes ( HbO and HbR) along the photon path using the Beer-Lambert law [39] . Thus, the fNIRS signal associated with related tasks can be distinguished from those corresponding to a resting state. Importantly, fNIRS is intrinsically safe, easily set up, and provides relatively high spatial resolution and simultaneous collection of multi-channel data. In the current study, we used an EEG-fNIRS bimodal system to examine brain activation and analyze the temporal-spatial features of intention understanding processing. By comparing the temporal-spatial features of brain activity during different types of intention understanding, we sought to elucidate the neural mechanisms underlying action intention understanding processing.
II. MATERIALS AND METHODS

A. PARTICIPANTS
Seventeen healthy participants voluntarily participated in the study (12 males and five females, with a mean age of 23 ± 1.6 years). None of the recruited participants reported neurological or psychiatric histories, or the use of medication. All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal visual acuity, and were right-handed, as confirmed by the Edinburgh Handedness Inventory. During EEG and fNIRS recording, participants received explicit instructions to carefully observe the presented pictures, and to attempt to understand the intention behind the observed hand-object interactions in the three conditions. To avoid eye movements, participants were asked to fixate on a central visual cross throughout the whole experiment. Before the recording, participants were informed that some of the hand-object interactions may be associated with the following intentions: (a) use of a grasped object, (b) movement of a grasped object, or (c) no obvious intention. During the recordings, participants were instructed to not give any overt responses. To avoid motor interference, reaction times were not recorded during the experiment.
All participants gave written informed consent to participate in the experimental procedures, which were approved by the Ethics Committee of Affiliated Zhongda Hospital, Southeast University (2016ZDSYLL002.0).
B. EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES
The experiment was performed in a quiet room to minimize environmental disturbance. Participants were seated in a comfortable chair with their heads on a chin rest. Stimuli were displayed on a computer monitor at a distance of 80 cm. Participants were asked to relax for at least 5 min prior to the experiment, and to remain relaxed throughout the experiment.
There were three hand-cup interaction conditions corresponding to different underlying intentions, as follows: (a) a right hand grasping the handle of a cup for the purpose of drinking (Td), (b) a right hand grasping the rim of a cup for the purpose of moving (Tm), and (c) a right hand touching a cup on the rim with an unclear intention (Tu). Examples of the three types of hand-object interaction are shown in Fig. 1 . EEG and fNIRS signals were collected from each participant as they attempted to understand the intention associated with each observed hand-object interaction. Fig. 2 shows a schematic diagram of the experimental protocol. During the experiment, participants sat on a chair in a quiet room in front of a computer monitor displaying the stimuli. Every trial consisted of the following sequence: a pre-task resting period in which a fixation cross was presented for 6 s was followed by a preparation block lasting 0.5 s, in which a cup without context (S0) appeared as a cue on the screen prompting the participant to prepare for the hand-cup interaction task. Then, in the observation block, a hand-on-cup action without context was presented for 3.5 s, showing a hand grasping or touching the cup (S1). The gap between the first (S0) and second (S1) stimulus was very short. In this way, the continuous image sequence created the perception of an action [30] , [40] . All participants identified the hand-cup interaction as the initial part of an action. During the observation block, participants attempted to understand the intention associated with each observed hand-cup interaction. Finally, participants rested for 6 s in the post-rest period. During measurement, the pre-rest and post-rest periods were continuous in the two subsequent trials, so these two blocks were used as the baseline block (12 s). The three hand-cup interaction conditions were presented in a random sequence. To avoid visual fatigue, the color of the cup alternated randomly between seven colors, and each cup color was shown four times. Therefore, the experiment consisted of a total of 84 trials (seven colors * four measurements * three condition types) and divided into four sessions. Each session was composed of 21 trials, with a 2-min rest period between sessions (Fig. 2) . Thus, each experiment lasted for 28.4 min.
C. SIGNAL ACQUISITION
We conducted EEG-fNIRS bimodal recording, as shown in Fig. 3a . EEG analog signals were recorded continuously with 64 Ag-AgCl active electrodes (Synamps2 and Scan4.4, Neuroscan, Fig. 3b ) according to the extended 10-20 system (Fig. 4a) , and two additional electrodes placed on the right and left mastoids served as a reference. Eye movements and blinks were monitored using bipolar horizontal and vertical electrooculogram (EOG) derivations via two pairs of electrodes: one pair attached to the external canthi, and the other to the infraorbital and supraorbital regions of the right eye. Both EEG and EOG signals were sampled at 1000 Hz.
For measuring fNIRS signals, we used a multichannel fNIRS instrument (LABNIRS, Shimadzu Corporation, Japan, Fig. 3c ) for acquisition of HbO and HbR during the intention conditions. Emitter and detectors optodes were placed on the participant's head, above the motor cortex, and channels 13 and 36 were set above the C3 and C4 areas, respectively (Fig. 4b) . A pair of emitter and detector optodes formed one channel. There were 16 emitters and 16 detectors in the arrangement, resulting in 48 fNIRS channels. The distance between the emitters and detectors was set at 3 cm [41] . The fNIRS data were acquired at a sampling rate of 37 Hz.
D. SIGNAL PREPROCESSING
The EEG signals were first band-pass filtered between 6 and 30 Hz to remove low and high frequency artifacts. Next, to remove eye movement and blink artifacts (i.e., EOG), an independent component analysis (ICA) was performed to find an unmixing matrix that linearly decomposed the 64-channel EEG data into 64 independent components (ICs) with the AMUSE (algorithm for multiple unknown source extraction) algorithm [42] implemented in the ICALAB toolbox [43] . ICs that were strongly correlated with EOG signals (Pearson's correlation coefficient |r| > 0.7) were considered to be responsible for EOG artifacts, and were set to zero vectors, whereas all other ICs were projected back onto the scalp to provide EEG signals free of EOG artifacts [44] .
For fNIRS signals, the data were band-pass filtered between 0.01 and 0.12 Hz to eliminate artifacts. The baseline period was defined from −1000 ms to 0 ms before the cue stimuli S0 presentation, and the mean value of the baseline was calculated for every trial. fNIRS data for all trials were corrected by subtracting this mean value to determine baseline alignment.
E. SOURCE ANALYSIS
To examine the neuropsychological mechanisms underlying intention understanding, we performed source analysis of brain activation during intention understanding tasks for both 64-channel EEG and 48-channel fNIRS, respectively.
For the EEG source analysis, we first used Matlab (2013a) (The MathWorks, Natick, MA, USA) to calculate the grand average for 17 participants. Then, standardized low-resolution electrical tomographic analysis (sLORETA) software [45] (http://www.uzh.ch/keyinst/loreta.htm) was applied to the 17-participant grand average. sLORETA reveals the underlying whole-head EEG activity of synchronously activated neuronal populations by computing their cortical localization from the scalp distribution of their electric fields. The sLORETA inverse solution is based on existing neuroanatomical and physiological knowledge, and a mathematical constraint called the smoothness assumption, which addresses the inverse problem by calculating current source density (CSD) from electrical signals recorded from the scalp to estimate the source location [46] . The solutions were based on the Talairach cortical probability brain atlas, digitized in Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) coordinates. The electrode locations were co-registered between both the spherical model (BESA) and realistic head geometry [47] . The inverse weight projections from the original EEG channels for each component contributing to the temporal a-clusters were exported into sLORETA. Crossspectra were computed and mapped to the Talairach atlas and cross-registered with the MNI coordinates, resulting in CSD estimates for each contributing component. The statistical significance of CSD was analyzed with the sLORETA software package. Because previous studies of action understanding reported temporal modulation of action and intention decoding within the first 400 ms [48] - [50] , a time window from 0 − 500 ms after observation block onset was selected for source analysis. First, the maximum standardized current density of the grand average of all participants was calculated based on the 64-ch EEG signals in each of the three conditions. Source localization analysis was then applied according to the maximum standardized current density. In this analysis stage, anatomical labels and Brodmann areas were reported in MNI space, with the possibility to correct to Talairach space [51] .
For fNIRS source analysis, previous studies reported that HbO concentration exhibits the greatest change during cognitive tasks [52] , [53] . Thus, we used the 17-participant grand average (calculated with Matlab) of the HbO signal for source analysis. To select the optimal time window for source analysis, we first conducted a t-test to examine the difference in HbO signal between the observation and baseline blocks (pre-rest plus post-rest periods), identifying periods of significant activation. After the optimal time window was selected, source analysis based on the HbO signal was applied as follows: five anatomical landmarks (nasion, inion, Cz, and left and right preauricular points) and fNIRS optodes (16 emitters, 16 detectors) were digitized using a 3D digitizer (FASTRAK; Polhemus, Colchester, VT, USA). Coordinates of the channels in real space were automatically calculated as intermediate points between the emitters and detectors. The location of each fNIRS channel and the topographical maps of the changes in HbO concentration were then superimposed onto the surface of the MNI standard 3D head model using FUSION 3D imaging software (Shimadzu Co., Ltd.). 
III. RESULTS
For EEG source analysis, we first obtained the curves of the maximum standardized current density of the grand average (n = 17) for three different conditions, respectively (Fig. 5) . According to Fig. 5 , we found three peaks in the curves of current density for all three conditions. Applying source localization analysis (Fig. 6 and Table 1 ) according to the three peaks of standardized current density revealed areas of activation corresponding to the first peak in the left hemisphere (Td: 130 − 170 ms, peak = 146 ms; Tm: 130 − 155 ms, peak = 143 ms; Tu: 130 − 145 ms, peak = 139 ms). In contrast, areas of activation corresponding to the second peak were detected in the right hemisphere (Td: 200−220 ms, peak = 206 ms; Tm: 180 − 205 ms, peak = 187 ms; Tu: 170 − 220 ms, peak = 185 ms). Moreover, areas of activation corresponding to the third peak were observed in the right hemisphere (Td: 416 − 437 ms, peak = 423 ms; Tm: 387 − 427 ms, peak = 411 ms; Tu: 375 − 395 ms, peak = 384 ms).
The results of the sLORETA source localization analysis are shown in Fig. 6 and Table 1 , including MNI coordinates, Brodmann areas (BA), and anatomical locations of activated brain regions for the three peaks of standardized current density. The results revealed that, for each condition, the first VOLUME 5, 2017 FIGURE 6. Three dimensional averaged sLORETA solutions (standardized current density at cortical voxels) of EEG sources for three conditions. (a) Drinking condition at first peak = 146 ms; (b) Drinking condition at second peak = 206 ms; (c) Drinking condition at third peak = 423 ms; (d) Moving condition at first peak = 143 ms; (e) Moving condition at second peak = 187 ms; (f) Moving condition at third peak = 411 ms; (g) Meaningless condition at first peak = 139 ms; (h) Meaningless condition at second peak = 185 ms; (i) Meaningless condition at third peak = 384 ms. Time points started from the observation block onset.
peak was located in the left temporal lobe, with the greatest intensity in the Td condition, followed by the Tm and Tu conditions. In contrast, the second peak was located in the right temporal lobe and occipital lobe, and intensity was greatest in the Tu condition, followed by the Tm and Td conditions. The third peak was also located in the right temporal lobe and occipital lobe, with the most intense activation in the Tu condition, followed by the Tm and Td conditions. The results revealed a tendency for brain activation to sequentially shift from the left to the right hemisphere. Moreover, for both the Td and Tm conditions, the intensity of the first peak was greater than that of the second and third, whereas for the Tu condition, the intensity of the first peak was lower than the second and third.
Regarding anatomical structure, the results shown in Fig. 6 and Table 1 indicate that activated areas included the middle temporal gyrus (BA39) and angular gyrus (BA39) in the left hemisphere during the first peak, in all three conditions. In contrast, for the second peak, the activated areas differed between conditions. In the Td condition, activated regions included the middle temporal gyrus (BA19, BA39), middle occipital gyrus (BA19), and the cuneus (BA19) in the right hemisphere. In the Tm condition, the activated regions included the middle temporal gyrus (BA19), middle occipital gyrus (BA19), and the cuneus (BA19) in the right hemisphere. In the Tu condition, the activated regions included the middle temporal gyrus (BA19), middle occipital gyrus (BA19), angular gyrus (BA39), and the cuneus (BA19) in the right hemisphere. Moreover, for the third peak, the activated areas differed between conditions. In the Td condition, the activated regions included the middle temporal gyrus (BA19, BA39) and the middle occipital gyrus (BA19) in the right hemisphere. In the Tm condition, the activated regions included the middle temporal gyrus (BA19, BA39) and middle occipital gyrus (BA19) in the right hemisphere. In the Tu condition, the activated regions included the middle temporal gyrus (BA19), middle occipital gyrus (BA19), and the cuneus (BA19) in the right hemisphere. Fig. 7 shows the results of the fNIRS source analysis, including a topographic map of the t-test analysis results from 1 − 6 s for the HbO signal between the observation and baseline block. The results in Fig. 7 indicate that there was strong brain activation from 2−5 s, with a peak around 3.5 s in all three conditions. For this reason, we selected 3.5 s as a time point to compare activation differences between the three conditions. Independent-samples t-tests were conducted to identify significant differences between task and baseline for three conditions (Fig. 8) . The results shown in Fig. 8 revealed strong activation in the PMC, primary motor cortex (M1), and TPJ for all three conditions, while activation in the left hemisphere was stronger than that in the right hemisphere. The t-values revealed that activation intensity was highest in the Td condition, followed by the Tm and Tu conditions. After scanning, a post-scan questionnaire was assessed for every participant. A shortened one color * three measurements * three condition types experimental paradigm as shown in Fig. 2 was presented to the participant. Participants were instructed to verbally report whether the image was related to drinking, moving, or if the action was meaningless, as a measure of their intention understanding. The mean rate of correct responses for all participants was 99.3%.
IV. DISCUSSION
EEG maximum standardized current density analysis revealed differences in the maximum standardized current density between three hand-cup interaction conditions for three different time peaks. Previous studies have suggested that several specific ERP components, including the N1 (150 − 200 ms), P2 (200 − 400 ms), N400 (200 − 600 ms), are related to intention processing [27] , [32] . In addition, Ortigue et al. [30] reported that the N1 (122 − 200 ms) is involved in action understanding. The authors proposed that the N1 is likely to be related to encoding observed motor acts as motor ''engrams'', enabling an individual to recognize an observed action. One previous study of action understanding reported that action goals are automatically discriminated at approximately 150 − 170 ms, as reflected by the N170 response [29] . Another study reported that the N190 component is related to early motor planning processes that influence the perception of biological motion [32] . In addition, other studies also reported that the P2 component is associated with the processing of action intention, particularly in the retrieval of information related to the recognition of action schemata [27] . A number of previous studies reported that the N400 potential is evoked when ''world-knowledge'' about typical human actions is violated [28] , or when tools are used in a non-canonical manner [33] . Moreover, several studies reported that actions which are purposeless, inappropriate or impossible affect the N400 component [28] , [54] , [55] . The three peaks observed in the current results are in accord with these previous findings.
The first peak shown in Fig. 5 suggests that observation of the two motor tasks with clear intentions (drinking [Td] and moving [Tm] ) was characterized by a stronger topographical pattern (Peak 1 in Fig. 5 ) with a left-lateralized CSD maximum in the middle temporal gyrus (BA39) and angular gyrus (BA39), compared with the observation of simple touching without a clear intention (Tu; see Fig. 6 and Table 1 ). In contrast, the observation of a simple touch with an unclear intention (Tu) produced stronger activation in the second peak compared with the observation of drinking (Td) and moving (Tm) (Peak 2 in Fig. 5 ). This second peak was characterized by a right-lateralized CSD maximum in the middle temporal gyrus (BA19), middle occipital gyrus (BA19), angular gyrus (BA39), and the cuneus (BA19) (Fig. 6 and Table 1 ). This trend was also found in Peak 3 (Fig. 5) , which was observed in the middle temporal gyrus (BA19, BA39), the middle occipital gyrus (BA19), and the cuneus (BA19) in the right hemisphere.
Ortigue et al. [30] reported a similar result in a previous study in which brain activation during intention understanding was divided into different microstates based on visual event-related potentials (VEPs). More prolonged VEPs were found in a topographical pattern at Microstate 3 for actions with clear intentions (i.e., the ''use'' and ''transport'' grip) compared with the observation of an intentionally opaque simple contact action. However, this pattern reversed at Microstate 4, and observation of images depicting an intentionally opaque simple contact action was associated with more prolonged VEPs compared with observing actions with clear intentions [30] . In accord with Ortigue et al.'s interpretation, we propose that the difference in the strength of Peak 1 was likely to be due to the amount of motor information contained in the different conditions. Thus, during observation of Td and Tm actions, processing of motor information about grip and its relation to the object may have required more detailed analysis of the motor aspects of the hand-object interaction to enable intention understanding, via comparison with the observer's own motor experience [30] , [56] , [57] . The level of cognitive load would presumably be less in the case of simple contact in the Tu condition, where intention understanding did not require a detailed analysis of the motor aspects of the hand-object interaction, because the handobject interaction was not familiar to the observer. Regarding Peak 2, it is plausible that understanding the intention associated with more commonly observed actions involved less cognitive load. This hypothesis could be tested by examining the difference in the strength of brain activation in the three different conditions. In the case of the simple hand on cup rim (Tu) action, because this hand-cup interaction was unfamiliar and the motor act was not strongly related to the object, the intention behind the action was likely to be unclear. Thus, more mental effort might be required to understand the intention behind the action, requiring a more complex analysis of the visual scene and possibly the involvement of inferential processing/mental state processing, as discussed below. Several previous studies of the MNS proposed the involvement of two different motor networks in the functioning of the MNS [58] , [59] . Many brain imaging studies of action understanding have suggested that the process of understanding actions in terms of objects or the details of a movement is predominantly lateralized to the left-hemisphere MNS [13] , [60] . This activation is primarily related to the encoding of the motor act itself (what) [60] - [62] . In contrast, a small number of studies have suggested that the right-hemisphere MNS may be involved in the process of understanding intentions underlying the actions (why). The results of a recent study of a split-brain patient support this notion [63] . The patient was tested in two conditions: the means inference task (MIT) and the intention inference task (IIT). The same stimuli were used in both tasks, and only the instructions differed. In the MIT, the patient was instructed to guess whether the means of the observed act were correct. In the IIT, the patient was instructed to guess whether the intention was correct. The responses were performed with either the right hand (left hemisphere) or left hand (right hemisphere). The patient exhibited lefthemisphere dominance for understanding ''what'' was done, and right-hemisphere dominance for understanding ''why'' an action was carried out. In the current study, EEG source localization analysis indicated a preceding peak in the left hemisphere and two subsequent peaks in the right hemisphere. In accord with the previous findings discussed above, we speculate that the first peak may have been related to encoding the means of the observed motor act (what), while the second and third peaks may reflect encoding of the intention of the observed motor act (why).
Similarly to previous action observation studies [64] , [65] , our fNIRS source analysis showed activation of the PMC, which is thought to be involved in identifying the intentions of actions through direct matching or ''resonance'' with stored representations of these actions [66] .
There is accumulating evidence for M1 activity during the observation of others' movements [67] , [68] . This notion is also supported by a recent macaque study [69] . Moreover, a transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) study reported that action observation modulated evoked excitability in M1 [70] . In addition, several studies have suggested that action observation involves replaying the aspects of MI activity required to perform the observed action, and may additionally reflect processing related to understanding [66] , imitation learning [71] or the mental rehearsal of an action [68] , [72] . The present fNIRS source analysis also revealed M1 activation.
Our fNIRS data also demonstrated strong activation in the TPJ, which has previously been reported to respond selectively to human body parts [73] and one's own body movements [74] . In addition, the TPJ is thought to be involved in distinguishing self/other social intentions and own-body mental imagery [75] , reasoning about the content of other peoples' minds (i.e., ToM) [76] , [77] , and inferring immediate goals and intentions from actions [78] .
The current EEG-fNIRS source analysis results indicated that activation in multiple areas was distributed throughout both the MNS and ToM network. Several previous studies [1] , [4] , [23] also concluded that the MNS is active during the visual processing of others' actions (how and what). Because reflecting on the intention of an agent performing an action necessarily involves processing what the agent is doing and how they are doing it, activation of brain areas associated with mentalizing that interact with the MNS might be expected to vary as a function of intention-related information conveyed by kinematic features. The PMC is reported to identify the goals or intentions of actions by their resemblance to stored representations of these actions (e.g., through direct matching or ''resonance'' of the corresponding motor circuits [66] . In contrast, other studies suggest that the ToM network is additionally recruited in the processing of others' action intentions (why) [4] , [22] . Several studies have proposed that the TPJ is associated with evaluating others' mental states in social contexts, particularly when taking a third-person perspective [76] , [79] . Moreover, a range of research suggests that the MNS and ToM network are inseparable during action intention understanding. Previous studies have indicated that the TPJ is the most likely candidate for a mentalizing area that might interact with the MNS [57] . This notion is supported by both the selective involvement of the TPJ in goal inferences, and its spatial proximity to the IPL regions displaying mirror properties [80] . Several fMRI studies have reported that action intention understanding involves a complex pattern of MNS and ToM responses, with mostly intact MNS responses accompanied by altered ToM activation and connectivity [1] , [4] , [23] . A meta-analysis of over 200 fMRI studies concluded that the MNS and ToM network are specialized for detecting different aspects of human behavior, while neither system aids or subserves the other; rather, the two systems are functionally complementary [22] . A number of previous studies have assumed that information about a simulated action in the MNS is passed to ToM-related regions for inferring an agent's intention [4] , [22] , [24] . Therefore, inferring others' intentions from their actions may involve both the MNS and ToM network [1] . The current EEG and fNIRS source analysis results revealed activation in both the MNS and ToM network. In the Tu condition, there was stronger activation in the ToM network. As a possible explanation, the stimuli presented in the Tu condition depicted an inconsistent or anomalous action that may have been outside the observer's repertoire of familiar and frequently executed actions. Thus, the automatic lower-level intention interpretation of the MNS may have provided insufficient information. To resolve this situation, the ToM network may have been recruited to provide more information about the action, to infer the higherlevel intention behind it.
Some studies also reported a common pattern of brain activation underlying ToM network and the default mode network (DMN) [81] , [82] . As one of the core regions of the DMN, the TPJ has been suggested to play a key role in mental state tasks [76] , [83] and self-reference [84] . Other studies have reported a striking overlap between the DMN and regions activated in the social understanding of others [85] , [86] . Taken together, the above findings indicate that the DMN may be involved in intention understanding.
The current results support the notion that the observation of others' actions in everyday life always recruits the MNS, enabling an immediate understanding of the observed acts and of the agent's intentions, provided sufficient contextual information is available. However, when novel or ambiguous actions are observed, inferential or mentalizing processes appear to also be engaged, requiring the activation of further brain areas [22] . The current findings indicate that intention understanding is a complex process that cannot be attributed to a single neuronal mechanism.
V. CONCLUSION
To investigate the neural mechanisms underlying action understanding, we used EEG-fNIRS bimodal measurement to investigate the temporal-spatial features of action intention understanding. EEG time-course analysis revealed that brain activation transferred from the left to the right hemisphere. Regional activation results indicated that both the MNS and ToM network are involved in action intention understanding, and the extent to which these two systems are engaged is determined by the clarity of the observed intention. EEG-fNIRS bimodal results revealed that action intention understanding involves complex and dynamic processes. 
